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ABSTRACT
Rust is an emerging programing language that aims at preventing
memory-safety bugs without sacrificing much efficiency. The
property is very attractive to developers, and many projects start
using the language. However, can Rust achieve the memory-safety
promise? This experience paper studies the question by surveying
the bug reports collected from two public datasets, Advisory-
db and Trophy-cases, which contain all existing CVEs (common
vulnerability and exposures) of Rust. We manually analyze each
bug in-depth and extract their memory-safety issues and culprits.
Our analysis leads to several novel findings and implications. Most
importantly, we find while Rust successfully limits memory-safety
risks to the realm of unsafe code, it also brings some side effects
that cause new patterns of dangling-pointer issues. In particular,
most of the use-after-free and double-free bugs are related to the
automatic destruction mechanism associated with the ownership-
based memory management scheme. Based on these findings, we
further provide several suggestions to program developers (i.e.,
the best practice of using some APIs) and compiler developers
(i.e., extend the safety checking into unsafe code, especially unsafe
constructors) for improving the resilience of Rust software. Our
work intends to raise more discussions regarding the memory-
safety issues of Rust and facilitate the maturity of the language.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Memory-safety bugs (e.g., buffer overflow) are critical software
reliability issues [18]. Such bugs commonly exist in software written
by system programming languages like C/C++ that allow arbitrary
memory access. The problem is challenging because regulating
memory access while not sacrificing the usability and efficiency
of the language is difficult. Rust is such a system programming
language that aims at addressing the problem. Since the release of
its stable version in 2015, the community of Rust grows very fast,
and many popular projects are developed with Rust, such as the
web browser Servo [3], and the operating system TockOS [13].
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To achievememory safety, Rust introduces a set of strict semantic
rules for writing compilable code and therefore preventing bugs.
The core of these rules is an ownership-basedmemorymodel, which
introduces an owner to each value. Ownership can be borrowed
among variables as references or aliases in two modes: mutable
or immutable. The main principle is that a value is not allowed
to have multiple mutable aliases at one program point. Once a
value is no longer owned by any variable, it would be destructed
immediately and automatically. To make the language more flexible
and extensible, Rust also supports unsafe code which may break
the rule but should be denoted with the reserved word ‘unsafe’.
Unsafe code can escape the memory-safety check of the compiler
and may lead to undefined behaviors or memory-safety bugs.
As Rust surges into popularity, a critical concern to the software
community is how Rust performs in combating memory-safety
bugs. Previous to our work, Evans et al. [9] have performed a
large-scale study showing that unsafe code is widely used in Rust
crates (projects). However, it is still unclear whether and how
unsafe code could undermine the memory safety of real-world Rust
programs. Since existing materials lack an in-depth understanding,
we attempt to address this question by empirically investigating a
set of critical bugs reported in real-world Rust projects. When we
are submitting this work, we notice another independent work [16]
also studies the same problem. While their work has developed
some understandings similar to our paper, our paper presents a
more detailed inspection regarding the culprits of memory-safety
bugs and generates several novel findings and implications different
from them. We will clarify the differences in Section 7.1.
To elaborate, we collect a dataset of memory-safety bugs from
two public repositories, Trophy-case that contains bugs found by
fuzzing tools from 88 Rust projects, and Advisory-db that includes
54 security bugs covering all existing CVEs of Rust. We manually
remove irrelevant, non-memory-safety bugs, and our final dataset
contains 39 memory-safety bugs. For each bug, we analyze the
consequence and culprit and then classify them into different
groups. Since the consequences are nothing special in comparison
with those of C/C++ [18], we adopt a top-down approach and
directly employ the labels like buffer overflow, use-after-free, and
double free. However, we have no prior knowledge regarding the
patterns of culprits in Rust, so we adopt a bottom-up approach and
cluster them if two culprits are similar.
Our inspection results show that buffer overflow (46%) and
dangling pointers (36%) are the major memory-safety issues in Rust,
and most of them can be traced to unsafe code. For buffer overflow
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bugs, we cannot derive any new patterns by bottom-up clustering
them, and the sub-classes are simply FFI (foreign function interface),
out-of-range access, and memory misalignment. However, most
use-after-free bugs and double-free bugs have different patterns in
comparison with those of traditional C/C++. In particular, four use-
after-free bugs are caused by unsafe constructors and temporary
buffer; two double-free bugs exist because of introducing shared
mutable aliases without disabling the destructor; four double-free
bugs happen only when the program panics before executing
the statement of mem::forget() which disables the destructor;
three double-free bugs occur only when the program panics before
executing the statement of set_len()which shrinks or extends the
buffer. These patterns are quite unique from traditional dangling-
pointer issues, and they are related to the new memory-safety
design of Rust, especially the automatic destruction mechanism.
To summarize, our analysis result reveals that while Rust
successfully limits the risks of memory-safety bugs to the realm
of unsafe code, it also brings side effects that make the language
vulnerable to dangling pointers. Moreover, when using unsafe code,
Rust has very limited power in preventing memory-safety bugs,
especially the buffer-overflow issues. Note that the patterns of buffer
overflow bugs in our dataset are nothing special in comparison
with those of C/C++. Buffer overflow generally originates from the
programer’s mistakes and propagates to unsafe code that eventually
leads to a buffer overflow. Since logical mistakes are unavoidable
and examining the safety of unsafe code is hard for static analysis,
buffer overflow is and will continue to be a critical issue for Rust
unless the usage of unsafe code could be further restricted. The real-
world buffer overflow cases in our study can provide evidence to
this claim. More surprisingly, the unique patterns of use-after-free
bugs and double-free bugs in our dataset revealed that the current
memory-safety design of Rust also brings significant side effects.
In particular, the automatic destruction mechanism associated
with the ownership-based memory management scheme incurred
most of the dangling-pointer issues. Based on these findings, we
further propose several suggestions to both program developers
and compiler developers for mitigating the problem and improve
the resilience of Rust software.
We highlight the contribution of our paper as follows.
• This paper serves as a pilot study to assess the effectiveness
and limitations of Rust in preventing memory-safety bugs. It
performs an in-depth analysis of the detailed patterns of real-
world memory-safety bugs and generates several important
findings different from existing work [9, 16], such as the
uniqueness of bug patterns compared to traditional C/C++.
• While it is generally perceived Rust as an enhancement of
memory safety, this paper firstly underlines the side effect
of Rust, i.e., it leads to most of the dangling-pointer issues in
our dataset and may make the language more vulnerable to
dangling pointers.
• We propose several novel suggestions to both Rust program
developers and compiler developers for mitigating the
risks of dangling pointers. For program developers, we
recommend them several best practices of using some
APIs safely, such as disabling the destructor as earlier as
possible and setting the buffer length at an appropriate
program point when shrinking or expending the buffer; For
compiler developers, our suggestion is to consider extending
the current safety checking to the realm of unsafe code,
especially unsafe constructors that lead to several memory-
safety bugs in our dataset.
2 PRELIMINARY
This section reviews the preliminary of memory-safety bugs and
discusses the mechanisms of Rust in preventing them.
2.1 Memory-Safety Bugs
Memory-safety bugs are serious issues for software systems.
According to the statistical report of MITRE1, memory-safety bugs
are enumerated among the most dangerous software vulnerabilities.
In general, memory-safety bugs are caused by arbitrary pointer
operations, such as using dangling pointers or out-of-range access.
Dangling pointer means accessing a buffer that has been freed. For
example, when calling free() in C, the buffer pointed by the pointer
would be deallocated or recycled. However, the pointer still points
to the deallocated memory address, known as a dangling pointer.
Reading/writing the dangling pointer would cause use-after-free
bugs. Freeing a dangling pointer would cause double free bugs. Out-
of-range access means accessing a buffer beyond the allocated range.
It could happen in two situations: an out-of-range pointer or offset
(e.g., due to boundary check faults) or an in-range pointer with an
invalid memory size (e.g., due to memory align issue). Reading an
out-of-range buffer would result in buffer over-read; writing the
buffer would result in buffer overflow. Besides, other memory-safety
issues include leaking uninitialized memory, memory leakage, and
data race. Allocating a memory space without proper initialization
might leak the old content, known as leaking uninitialized memory.
If a buffer is not freed but becomes inaccessible to the program,
memory leakage happens. Data race is another special type of
memory-safety issue related to concurrent memory access.
To combat such bugs, classical strategies are two-fold. One is
to design memory protection mechanisms, such as stack canary,
ASLR, etc. Although such mechanisms are effective, they only
increase the difficulty of attacks and cannot prevent them. The other
strategy is to prevent introducing memory-safety bugs from the
beginning, such as using type-safe languages, like Java. However,
the enforcement of the memory-safety feature may also pose
limitations to the language, making it inefficient for system-level
software development with rigorous performance requirements.
2.2 Memory-Safety of Rust
Rust is a system programming language that aims at preventing
memory-safety bugs while not sacrificing the performance. It
approaches the goal by introducing a set of strict semantic rules
at the compiler level. In this way, Rust can be more efficient than
other programming languages (e.g., Go) that rely much on runtime
memory checking and garbage collection [6].
Figure 1 overviews the idea of Rust. Rust is in nature a hybrid
programming language, including a safe part and an unsafe part.
The safe part guarantees that the behaviors of all the code and APIs
are well-defined, and programs using safe APIs only are less risky
1https://cwe.mitre.org/top25
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Figure 1: Idea of Rust for preventing memory-safety bugs.
to memory-safety issues. The unsafe part has no such guarantee
and may lead to undefined behaviors, but it is necessary to meet
some specific needs, e.g., efficient memory access for software
development with rigorous performance requirements. Any code
that may lead to undefined behaviors should be declared as unsafe,
such as dereferencing raw pointers, calling FFIs, and unsafe APIs.
Actually, many safe APIs also employ unsafe APIs internally. A
function calling unsafe APIs can be declared as either safe or unsafe,
which mainly depends on the developer’s decision. Rust cannot
check whether the declaration is correct or not. Therefore, falsely
declaring an API as safe is dangerous and could undermine the
security of safe Rust. Note that Rust is not interested in memory
leakage issues. Any code that may cause memory leakage is safe in
Rust. Therefore, our following discussion will not include memory
leakage issues.
The core of safe Rust is a novel ownership-based memory
management model (a.k.a. memory model) [10]. Ownership means
a value should have one variable or identifier as its owner,
and ownership is exclusive that a value can have only one
owner. However, ownership can be borrowed among variables as
references or aliases in two modes: immutable (default) or mutable
(with a ‘mut’ notation). The memory model assumes that only one
variable can have mutable access to a value at any program point
while other aliases have neither mutable nor immutable access at
that point, or only immutable access can be shared among multiple
aliases. Rust implements a borrow checker in its compiler to achieve
the goal. The borrowed ownership expires automatically when the
program execution exits the scope. If a value is no longer owned
by variables, it would be destructed immediately to reclaim the
buffer no longer used. Associated with the model, Rust introduces
a lifetime checker which assures that the lifetime of a borrowed
ownership would last long enough for use in other functions.
Together, they form a basis for Rust in preventing memory-safety
bugs. Next, we discuss how these mechanisms can prevent memory-
safety issues.
2.2.1 Preventing Dangling Pointer. In safe Rust, pointers should
be initiated when defining them. This enables the compiler to
trace the abstract states (ownership and lifetime) of the pointed
buffer and perform sound program analysis. Therefore, it is
other
2
memory 
vulnerability
36
denial-of-
service
6
crypto-failure
10
(a) Advisory-db.
arith
36
logic
41
loop
7oom
20
oor
48
so
4
uaf
1
uninit
1
unwrap
17
utf-8
7
panic
18
other
6
security
5
(b) Trophy-case.
Figure 2: Distribution of bugs in public datasets.
generally impossible to dereference or free dangling pointers in
safe Rust. Note that while defining raw pointers is valid in safe
Rust, dereferencing them is only allowed as unsafe.
However, Rust may also bring side effects to memory safety.
Considering the mechanism that values would be automatically
destructed when they are no longer owned by any variables, it may
falsely destruct some values and introduce dangling pointers. This
is possible because unsafe code can disrupt the static analysis and
may lead to unsound results. We will elaborate more on this point
in Section 4.3 and 4.4.
2.2.2 Preventing Out-of-Range Access. Enforcing pointer initial-
ization also benefits in-range buffer access because each pointer
points to a memory region of a particular type, such as i32. It
guarantees that memory data are properly aligned. For most data
containers, such as Vec<T>, Rust maintains a length field for the
object and performs boundary checks during runtime. Note that
all these mechanisms are effective in safe Rust, dereferencing raw
pointers is unsafe that may lead to out-of-range access.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Objective
Our work aims at evaluating the effectiveness of Rust in preventing
memory-safety bugs. Particularly, we are interested in the conse-
quences of memory-safety bugs and the culprits that lead to them.
Analyzing these issues has three benefits. Firstly, we can provide
objective evaluation results about the memory-safety status of the
current Rust language to its potential users. Secondly, we can extract
some common patterns of code that are risky to memory-safety
issues and warn developers to use them carefully. Moreover, the
culprits of some bugs can provide essential information for further
improving the language towards more resilience to memory-safety
bugs.
3.2 Challenges and Countermeasures
3.2.1 Data Collection. The first challenge for our study is how to
collect bugs, especially memory-safety ones. Thanks to GitHub,
many influential Rust projects are maintained online, and we can
find the issues and bug fixes for particular projects. However,
since GitHub is free-organized, the formats and qualities of the
bug reports can vary a lot. Such limitations pose difficulties for
extracting and analyzing bugs accurately and automatically. As
3
our research does not focus on proposing automatic analysis
approaches, we prefer manual inspection which is more accurate.
While manual inspection is precise, it sacrifices the scalability.
Therefore, we try to find the most representative cases for manual
inspection. Luckily, there are two third-party bug repositories that
meet our need, Advisory-db2 and Trophy-cases3.
Advisory-db is a repository that collects security vulnerabilities
found in Rust software, and it is a superset of existing CVEs4
related to Rust programs. The dataset contains dozens of entries
from 52 contributors. After filtering irrelevant entries, such as
denial-of-service bugs and crypto issues (as shown in Figure 2a),
we find 36 high-quality memory-safety bugs for further study.
Trophy-case collects a list of software bugs found by fuzzing
tools. The bug reports originate from the users of fuzzing tools
for Rust programs, such as cargo-fuzz5, AFL 6, and Honggfuzz 7.
The repository contains 192 bug entries from 30 contributors. As
shown in Figure 2b, trophy-case categorizes these bugs into several
categories, such as panic, arithmetic error, and out-of-range access.
Among all these bugs, only five are labeled with a security tag and
contain memory-safety issues. Because Advisory-db and Trophy-
cases have two bugs in common, we finally get 39 (5+36-2) memory-
safety bugs for further study.
Code (1) Buffer over-read in brotli-rs caused by incorrect boundary
checking.
1 buf: Vec<Option<Symbol>>
2 -://const MAX_INDEX: usize = 32768 - 2; /*buggy code*/
3 -://if insert_at_index > MAX_INDEX { /*buggy code*/
4 +:if insert_at_index > self.buf.len() - 1 { /*bug fix*/
5 /*ignore some code here*/
6 }
7 self.buf[insert_at_index] = Some(symbol);
Figure 3: Example of non-memory-safety bugs.
To better clarify the difference of panic bugs frommemory-safety
issues, we demonstrate an example in Code 18. The buggy code
contains an invalid buffer-access operation that employs a wrong
length indicator (i.e., MAX_INDEX) for boundary checking. As a result,
invalid indexes within the range of [self.buf.len(), MAX_INDEX]
could be falsely employed as the index for insertion. The code is
compilable with Rust compiler, but the programwould panic during
execution because the trait Vec<T> maintains a length field and
checks the index validity during runtime. Therefore, although the
bug involves invalid memory access, it is not a buffer overflow.
3.2.2 Bug Analysis. The second challenge is how to analyze
memory-safety bugs and extract useful knowledge accordingly.
Specifically, we are interested in the consequences and culprits of
each memory-safety bug.
For the consequences, we adopt a top-down approach. Because the
taxonomy of memory-safety bugs is well studied in the literature
2https://github.com/RustSec/advisory-db/
3https://github.com/rust-fuzz/trophy-case
4https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=rust
5https://github.com/rust-fuzz/cargo-fuzz
6https://github.com/rust-fuzz/afl.rs
7https://github.com/rust-fuzz/honggfuzz-rs
8https://github.com/ende76/brotli-rs/issues/7
Table 1: Distribution of memory-safety bugs in our dataset.
Program Type Bug Type Number of Bugs
Executable Program Error 2
Third-Party Library Error 24Undefine Behavior 10
Standard Library Error 2Undefine Behavior 1
Total 39
(e.g., [18]), we simply adopt existing categorization method, such
as buffer overflow, use-after-free, double free, and data race.
For the culprits, we employ a bottom-up approach, i.e., we cluster
similar bugs while do not assume any prior categories. To elaborate,
we manually analyze the commit of each bug fix on Github. By
comparing the buggy code and bug fix, we can locate the root
cause of each bug. In general, a memory-safety bug can be caused
by multiple issues, such as the coexistence of an unsafe pointer
dereference and a logical error (e.g., integer overflow or boundary-
checking error). For simplicity, we are not interested in logical errors
because Rust is designed to help developers prevent dangerous
memory-safety issues even their code contains logical errors. We
are interested in how logical errors escalate to memory-safety bugs.
Typical culprits should be related to unsafe Rust. We are interested
in how they lead to memory-safety issues.
4 RESULTS OF MEMORY-SAFETY BUG
ANALYSIS
This section presents our analysis results of the memory-safety
bugs in the collected dataset. We first overview the dataset and
then present detailed discussions for each bug category.
4.1 Overview of Memory-Safety Bugs
Finding 1: The definition of memory-safety bugs are different
between Rust and other languages. For Rust, a safe API is treated as
buggy if it may lead to undefined behaviors, which, however, would
not for other languages.
We first categorize these bugs according to the types of their
host programs, and the result is shown in Table 1. Three bugs lie
in the standard library that Rust compiler provides; 34 bugs lie
in third-party libraries; two bugs existed in executable programs.
During analysis, we find an interesting phenomenon: about 1/3
bugs (10+1) of Rust libraries may not be real bugs that have errors
inside. They just violate the memory-safety promise of Rust, e.g.,
an API declared as safe but may lead to shared mutable aliases if
not used properly, like Code 17. However, when using these APIs
carefully, the programs would not have memory-safety bugs. Such
cases may not be treated as bugs in other programming languages,
and the community is more rigorous towards the memory-safety
risks of Rust.
Based on the analysis approach discussed in Section 3.2.2, we also
categorize memory-safety bugs based on their consequences and
culprits. Table 2 overviews our analysis result. 18 bugs are buffer
overflow/over-read issues: four caused by FFI, 11 by unsafe out-
of-bound memory access, and three by memory alignment issues.
Note that since buffer overflow and buffer over-read often coexist
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Table 2: Categorization of memory-safety bugs in our
dataset.
Bug Type Culprit Bug #
Buffer Overflow/
Over-Read
foreign function interface 4
unsafe out-of-range access 11
memory alignment issue 3
Use-After-Free unsafe constructor with temp buf. 4deallocation error 1
Double-Free/
Free Invalid Pointer
shared mutable aliases 2
late disabling of detructor 4
late alias invalidation 2
early alias activation 1
Data Race
unsync. internal mutation 1
shared mutable aliases 1
memory ordering error 1
Other Issues leak unintiliazed buffer 1bad function exposure 3
Total 39
in our dataset, we do not further differentiate them. 14 bugs are
related to dangling pointers, including five use-after-free bugs and
nine double-free bugs. The culprits of dangling pointers are very
unique in Rust, which are mainly related to automatic destruction
mechanism. Besides, there are three data-race bugs, one bug leaking
uninitialized memory, and three bugs of other issues.
4.2 Buffer Overflow
Finding 2: Rust has limited power in preventing buffer overflow
unless the usage of unsafe code could be further restricted.
4.2.1 Foreign Function Interface. FFIs are only allowed in unsafe
Rust because they are inconsistent with the Rust memory-safety
model. In our dataset, we find two types of FFI issues: format
string (e.g., CVE-2019-15546, CVE-2019-15547, CVE-2019-15548)
and compatibility (e.g., CVE-2018-20998).
Code 2 presents a format string issue in ncurses-rs. The project
implements a thin wrapper of the original ncurses library in C.
This code sample is a Rust function printw() which directly calls
the corresponding C function without checking the validity of
the arguments. This allows users to pass any format string as the
argument, which may incur buffer over-read. It can also incur buffer
overflow issues when employing %n as the format string and an
address &a as the arguments, which means over-writing the buffer
of &a with the number of printed characters before %n.
Code 3 presents a compatibility issue between Rust and MSVC
(Microsoft Visual C++). The buggy code declares repr(C) for the
enum DType, which tells the compiler to align the memory layout
as what C does. However, the declaration is implicit and leads to
compatibility issues when collaborating with MSVC. The bug fix
enforces the layout to be aligned as u32 with repr(u32). Besides,
to match the data layout, the bug fix also replaces uint8_t with
c_int in the program body.
4.2.2 Unsafe Out-of-Range Access. There are two requirements
for accomplishing such bugs: unsafe memory read/write and
out-of-range access. Unsafe APIs in Rust, such as ptr::read()
and ptr::write(), enable developers to perform arbitrary buffer
Code (2) CVE-2019-15547: FFI format string issue in ncurses-rs.
1 /*file: ll.rs*/
2 extern pub fn printw(_:char_p) -> c_int;
3 /*file: lib.rs*/
4 pub fn printw(s: &str) -> i32 {
5 unsafe{ll::printw(s.to_c_str().as_ptr())}
6 }
Code (3) CVE-2018-20998: FFI compatability issue in arrayfire.
1 -://#[repr(C)]
2 +:#[repr(u32)]
3 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
4 pub enum DType { F32 = 0, C32 = 1, F64 = 2, ...U64 = 9, }
5 -://fn af_scan(op: uint8_t, /*ignore some params*/) -> c_int;
6 +:fn af_scan(op: c_uint, /*ignore some params*/) -> c_int;
Code (4) CVE-2018-1000810: Integer overflow in standard library.
1 -://let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(self.len() * n);
2 +:let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(self.len().
3 +: checked_mul(n).expect("capacity␣overflow"));
4 unsafe {
5 ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(buf.as_ptr(), /*ignore params*/);
6 ...//ignore some code here
7 }
Code (5) CVE-2019-15550: memory alignment issue in simd-json.
1 let src: &[u8] = unsafe { &self.input.get_unchecked(idx..) };
2 -://let v: __m256i = unsafe {
3 -:// _mm256_loadu_si256(src.get_unchecked(..32).as_ptr()
4 -:// as *const __m256i) };
5 +:let v: __m256i =
6 +: if src.len() >= 32 { unsafe {
7 +: _mm256_loadu_si256(/*ignore params*/)}}
8 +: else { unsafe {
9 +: padding.get_unchecked_mut(/*ignore params*/);
10 +: _mm256_loadu_si256(/*ignore params*/) }};
Code (6) CVE-2019-12083: unsoundness in standardRust library that
may lead to memory alignment issue.
1 -://#[stable(feature="error_type_id", since="1.34.0")]
2 +:#[doc(hidden)]
3 +:#[unstable(feature = "error_type_id",
4 +: reason = "...memory unsafe to override in user code",
5 +: issue = "60784")]
6 fn type_id(&self) -> TypeId where Self: 'static {
7 TypeId::of::<Self>()
8 }
Figure 4: Cases of buffer overflow.
read/write without the memory-safety guarantee of Rust. Such bugs
are very common (e.g., CVE-2018-1000810 and CVE-2018-1000657).
Code 4 presents a buffer overflow bug due to integer overflow.
The bug lies in line 1 which computes the vector capacity with
self.len() * n. The result could be larger than the max value
that an integer type can represent when either of the multiplication
factors is very large. If the result too large, the extra bits would
be discarded. As a result, an unexpected small buffer could be
allocated. This is a logical error, and the following unsafe API
(i.e., copy_nonoverlapping()) further triggers out-of-range write.
The bug fix replaces the raw arithmetic operators with Rust
encapsulated safe ones, such as checked_mul(). In general, the
5
Code (7) Toy bug of unsafe constructor with temporary buffer.
1 fn test() -> Vec<u8> {
2 let mut s = String::from("lifetime␣test");
3 let ptr = s.as_mut_ptr();
4 unsafe {
5 let v = Vec::from_raw_parts(ptr, s.len(), s.len());
6 v
7 }}
8 fn main() {
9 let v = test();
10 assert_eq!('l' as u8,v[0]); /*fail*/
11 }
Code (8) CVE-2019-16140: use-after-free bug in chttp.
1 fn from(buffer: Buffer) -> Vec<u8> {
2 let mut slice = Buffer::allocate(buffer.len);
3 let len = buffer.copy_to(&mut slice);
4 unsafe {
5 -:// Vec::from_raw_parts(slice.as_mut_ptr(), len,
6 -:// slice.len())
7 +: let vec = Vec::from_raw_parts(
8 +: slice.as_mut_ptr(),len, slice.len());
9 +: mem::forget(slice);
10 +: vec
11 }}
Code (9) A more complicated case in sxd-document.
1 -://index: RefCell<HashMap<InternedString, InternedString>>,
2 +:index: RefCell<HashSet<InternedString>>,
3 ...//ignore some code here
4 -://let search_string = InternedString::from_str(s);
5 -://let interned_str = *index.entry(search_string)
6 -:// .or_insert_with(|| self.do_intern(s));
7 +: if let Some(interned) = index.get(s) return /*ignore detail*/
8 +: index.insert(self.do_intern(s));
9 ...//ignore some code here
10 pub struct InternedString {data: *const u8, len: usize, }
11 impl InternedString {
12 ...//unsafe as_slice() returns a pointer to self.data
13 }
Code (10) CVE-2019-15551: deallocation error in rust-smallvec.
1 unsafe {
2 if new_cap <= self.inline_size() {
3 ...//ignore some code here
4 }
5 else if new_cap != cap {
6 ...//ignore some code here
7 }
8 +: else { return; }
9 deallocate(ptr, cap);
10 }
11 unsafe fn deallocate<T>(ptr: *mut T, capacity: usize) {
12 let _vec: Vec<T> = Vec::from_raw_parts(ptr, 0, capacity);
13 }
Figure 5: Samples of use-after-free bugs.
patterns of such bugs are nothing special compared to traditional
buffer overflow issues in C/C++.
4.2.3 Memory Alignment Issue. Alignment issues can also trigger
out-of-range access, but the size of the overflowed memory is
limited to the size of the specified buffer type. Code 5 presents
a real-world bug. The program loads a 256-bit value from the vector
of u8. However, it does not check if the vector has been assigned
enoughmemory slots that align the data type (i.e., 32 bytes) properly.
If not, buffer over-read would be triggered. Such bugs in nature are
similar to unsafe out-of-range access.
Code 6 presents a special memory-safety bug without unsafe
code. The function type_id() returns the error type of the Error
trait. This is a safe function and should not incur memory-security
bugs. However, developers may falsely downcast the trait and
override the default implementation of type_id(), e.g., let the
function returns a wrong type that requires a larger buffer size. This
would lead to memory alignment issues when accessing the buffer.
The problem has not been fixed perfectly so far, and developers
temporarily marked the function as unstable.
Based on our analysis, we can know Rust has limited power
in preventing buffer overflow, especially unsafe out-of-range
memory access. Such bugs originate from programer’s mistakes
and propagate to unsafe code that eventually leads to a buffer
overflow. Because Rust has no magic in preventing mistakes and
unsafe code is popular in current Rust projects [9], buffer overflow
seems unavoidable. The real-world buffer overflow cases in our
study can provide evidence to this claim.
4.3 Use-After-Free Bugs
Finding 3:Most use-after-free bugs (unsafe constructor with temporary
buffer) have unique patterns in Rust in comparison with those of
traditional C/C++, and they are caused by the side effects of the
automatic destruction scheme.
4.3.1 Unsafe Constructor with Temporary Buffer. Rust relies on
the lifetime checking mechanism to prevent dangling pointers.
However, the mechanism becomes less effective when using unsafe
constructors. Even worse, the automatic destruction mechanism
makes such objects constructed with unsafe constructors more
vulnerable to dangling pointers. In our dataset, 4/5 use-after-
free bugs have culprits in this pattern. Code 7 demonstrates
a toy example. The test function composes a vector using an
unsafe constructor from_raw_parts() and returns the vector. The
constructor simply dereferences the pointer argument and returns
a reference, and it leaves the lifetime checking responsibility to
developers. However, the pointer points to a temporary string s that
would be destructed automatically when the function returns. Using
the returned vector in the main function would cause use-after-free
issues.
Code 8 presents a real-world example. The function returns a
Vec<u8> composed with Vec::from_raw_parts(). However, the
buffer of slice would become invalid when the function returns.
To fix the bug, the patch disables the destructor of slice by
calling mem::forget(). In practice, such bugs may hide deeply in
complicated traits. Code 99 presents an example. Line 5 searches a
string from the hashmap; if the string is not found, it takes the string
9https://github.com/shepmaster/sxd-document/issues/47
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(search_string) as the key and inserts the pair of (key, value) into
the hash map. However, the key would be destructed when the
function returns. To fix the bug, developers replace HashMap with
HashSet. Apparently, the bug should be HashMap and is irrelevant
to unsafe code. But it is actually caused by unsafe code. The root
cause lies in the design of the trait InternedString, which relates
to the raw pointer of its member data at line 10.
4.3.2 Unsafe Buffer Deallocation. Bugs in this category are similar
as triditional cases that falsely deallocate some buffer. Rust
may incur such bugs because it provides unsafe APIs for fast
deallocation without lifetime checking. Code 10 presents a bug
in rust-smallvec. The buggy code misses an else branch. As a
result, it falsely calls deallocate() for some cases.
4.4 Double-Free Bugs
Finding 4: All double-free bugs have unique patterns compared
to those of traditional C/C++. While the bugs of shared mutable
aliases are caused by the side effects of automatic destruction, other
bugs (late disabling of detructor, late alias invalidation, ealier alias
activation) happen only when the program panics with automatic
stack unwinding.
4.4.1 Shared Mutable Aliases. If a buffer is owned by multiple
objects concurrently, running the destructors of these objects would
free the buffer twice. In general, generating multiple mutable
aliases is only possible via unsafe Rust. We demonstrate a toy
example with Code 11. In this example, the destructor of src
will run twice: firstly when func1 returns, and secondly when
main returns. To fix such issues, a common practice is to employ
either mem::ManuallyDrop<T> or mem::forget() that can prevent
executing the destructor of T when it expires. Such cases can be
found in CVE-2018-20996 (Code 12), CVE-2019-16144, etc.
4.4.2 Late Disabling of Detructor. Rust compiler has two modes
to runtime error handling: panic or abort. Panic is the default
mode that performs stack unwinding automatically and reclaim
the allocated resources; abort simply ends the process directly. Our
following discussed double-free issues only exist in the panic mode.
Some double-free bugs have employed mem::forget(), but the
program may panic before function is called. In this way, the
shared buffer will still be freed twice during stack unwinding.
In our dataset, four bugs are exactly the same pattern, including
CVE-2019-16880 (Code 13), CVE-2019-15552, CVE-2019-15553, and
CVE-2019-16881. A common fix is to replace mem::forget() with
mem::ManuallyDrop<T>. Actually, mem::forget() is a wrapper of
ManuallyDrop::new() but does not return a ManuallyDrop object.
4.4.3 Late Alias Invalidation. Invalidating aliases too late can also
incur double free during unwinding. Code 14 is an example that
inserts new elements into a vector at the position index. To this end,
it extends the buffer and moves (copies) all the elements after index
backward. If the program panics right after this operation, there will
be two mutable aliases of the elements between index and index +
lower_size_bound. The bug fix calls set_len() immediately after
the copy operation. In an extreme case, developers may delay calling
set_len() to the destruction state, which is essentially discouraged
in Rust. Code 1510 presents such an example, the destructor contains
an unsafe function call that sets the length of map.entries to 0.
Note that the implementation of Iterator for Drainmoves (copies)
the entries out from the map, which incurs two mutable aliases.
4.4.4 Early Alias Activation. In contrary to late alias invalidation,
activating an alias too earlier may end up dropping invalid pointers
if the pointer has not been fully initialized before the program
panics. We present one example in Code 16. It applies a vector
with capacity pixel_count and sets the length of the vector
accordingly. Then the program starts to initialize the elements
of the vector. However, if the program panics before finalizing
the initialization, running the destructor would lead to dropping
uninitialized memory.
4.5 Data Race
4.5.1 Unsynchronized Internal Mutation. A function that takes
immutable parameters but mutates internally is likely to be
vulnerable to race conditions. Executing the function concurrently
in multiple threads would cause data race. Code 17 presents
such an example. The function trigger_multi_frame_capture()
accepts an immutable argument &self, which however may mutate
the object internally when calling TriggerMultiFrameCapture().
Therefore, executing the function concurrently would incur data
race. Fixing the bug is simply changing the parameter to mutable.
This gives the compiler a hint that the two mutable aliases of self
should not exist at the same time.
4.5.2 Shared Mutable Aliases. Generating multiple mutable aliases
is unsafe and is vulnerable to race conditions. We find one such bug
in http. In Code 15, a function implemented int the Iterator for
Drain returns an item containing a pointer to a buffer. Calling the
function multiple times would generate multiple mutable aliases to
the buffer. This is undefined behavior in Rust and may lead to data
race under some program contexts.
4.5.3 Memory Odering Error. Programs errors without unsafe
may also incur data-race bugs as well. Memory ordering error
is a typical case. Code 18 implements a Drop function for the
RwLockWriteGuard of a spinlock. However, it misuses the atomic
memory ordering Relaxed, which imposes no constraints on other
threads regarding the execution order. As a result, the variable may
have another mutable reference before the lock is actually released.
The correct version should employ Ordering::Release instead.
4.6 Other Issues
There are four other issues related to memory-safety bugs but do
not belong to the prvious categories.
4.6.1 Leak Unitiliazed Buffer. The bug happens when a buffer is
not initilized before use and the program has logical errors leaking
the historical data stored in the buffer. Rust provides unsafe APIs
for fast buffer allocation. Such APIs generally apply a new space
without initializating it and therefore are vulnerable to leaking
unitialized memory. Code 19 presents such a bug. The code extends
the buffer of Vec<i32> with an unsafe method set_len(), which
simply changes the length indicator of the vector and applies new
10https://github.com/hyperium/http/issues/354
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Code (11) Toy double-free bug of shared mutable aliases.
1 impl Drop for Foo {
2 fn drop(&mut self) { println!("Dropping:␣{}", self.s); }
3 }
4 struct Foo {s: String}
5 /*fix2:struct Foo {s: mem::ManuallyDrop<String>}*/
6 fn fun2(mut src: &mut String) -> Foo{
7 let s = unsafe { String::from_raw_parts(
8 src.as_mut_ptr(), src.len(), 32) };
9 Foo{s:s}
10 }
11 fn fun1() -> Foo{
12 let mut src = String::from("Dropped␣twice!");
13 let foo = fun2(&mut src);
14 /*fix1:std::mem::forget(src);*/
15 foo
16 }
17 fn main() { let foo = fun1(); }
Code (12) CVE-2018-20996: shared mutable aliases in crossbeam.
1 enum Payload<T> {
2 -:// Data(T),
3 +: Data(ManuallyDrop<T>),
4 Blocked(*mut Signal<T>),
5 }
6 impl<T> Cache<T> {
7 fn into_node(self) -> Owned<Node<T>> {
8 match self {
9 Cache::Data(t) => Owned::new(Node {
10 -:// payload: Payload::Data(t),
11 +: payload: Payload::Data(ManuallyDrop::new(t)),
12 next: Atomic::null(),
13 }),
14 Cache::Node(n) => n,
15 }
16 }
17 }
Code (13) CVE-2019-16880: late disabling of destructor in linea.
1 unsafe {
2 +: let (a, b) = (ManuallyDrop::new(a), ManuallyDrop::new(b));
3 /*ignore some code; may panic in the following loop.*/
4 for i in 0..N::to_usize() { for j in 0..M::to_usize() {
5 ptr::write(&mut c.getMut()[i][j],
6 f(ptr::read(&a[i][j]), ptr::read(&b[i][j])));
7 }}
8 -:// mem::forget((a, b)); //buggy code
9 Matrix(c.assume_init())
10 }
Code (14) CVE-2018-20991: late alias invalidation in smallvec.
1 unsafe {
2 let old_len = self.len();
3 let ptr = self.as_mut_ptr().offset(index as isize);
4 ptr::copy(ptr, ptr.offset(lower_size_bound as isize),
5 old_len - index);
6 +: self.set_len(index);
7 for (off, element) in iter.enumerate() {
8 /*code may panic and would cause trouble*/
9 }
10 }
Code (15) late alias invalidation in the destructor in http.
1 /*reimplemented in the bug fix*/
2 impl<'a, T> Iterator for Drain<'a, T> {
3 /*unsafe implication causing duplication of entries*/
4 }
5 impl<'a, T> Drop for Drain<'a, T> {
6 fn drop(&mut self) {
7 -:// unsafe {
8 -:// let map = &mut *self.map;
9 -:// debug_assert!(map.extra_values.is_empty());
10 -:// map.entries.set_len(0);
11 -:// }
12 +: for _ in self {}
13 }
14 }
Code (16) CVE-2019-16138: early alias activation in image.
1 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pixel_count);
2 unsafe { ret.set_len(pixel_count); }
3 {
4 let chunks_iter = ret.chunks_mut(uszwidth);
5 let mut pool = Pool::new(8);
6 try!(pool.scoped(|scope| { for chunk in chunks_iter {
7 let mut buf = Vec::<RGBE8Pixel>::with_capacity(uszwidth);
8 unsafe {
9 buf.set_len(uszwidth);
10 /*ignore code initializing buf*/
11 }
12 Ok(())
13 }) as Result<(), ImageError>); }
14 }
Figure 6: Samples of double-free bugs.
space. There is no problem if the buffer is properly used afterward.
However, the code has other logical issues that do not fill the buffer
properly.
4.6.2 Bad Function Exposure. Some functions should not be
exposed to users as safe APIs, and calling these functions directly
may lead to segmentation faults. All the three issues we found come
from one project generator. As shown in Code 20, one bug (line
1) exposes the function new taking raw pointers as a safe function;
the second bug (line 3) exposes a deprecated function to users
without declaring the deprecated attribute (the buggy version
only comments the function as deprecated); the third bug (line 6)
exposes a function that should not be called by users directly.
5 IMPLICATION OF ANALYSIS RESULT
This section discusses the implications of our analysis results
from three perspectives: the overall assessment results of Rust
to potential users, practical coding recommendations to program
developers, and improvement suggestions to compiler developers.
5.1 Overall Assessment Result to Potential
Users
Implication 1: Rust successfully limits memory-safety risks to
unsafe code. In general, memory-safety bugs should be able to be
traced back to unsafe code, and the only exception should be that
some safe APIs are unsound.
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Code (17) CVE-2019-16142: unsoundness in renderdoc-rs.
1 -:// fn trigger_multi_frame_capture(&self, num_frames:u32) {
2 +: fn trigger_multi_frame_capture(&mut self, num_frames:u32){
3 unsafe {
4 /*call a foreign function implemented in C*/
5 }}
Code (18) CVE-2019-16137: memory odering error in spin-rs.
1 impl<'rwlock, T:?Sized> Drop for RwLockWriteGuard<'rwlock, T>{
2 fn drop(&mut self) {
3 -:// self.lock.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
4 +: self.lock.store(0, Ordering::Released);
5 }}
Code (19) CVE-2018-20992: leak uninitialized buffer in claxon.
1 fn ensure_buffer_len(mut buffer: Vec<i32>, new_len: usize)
2 -> Vec<i32> {
3 if buffer.len() < new_len {
4 if buffer.capacity() < new_len {
5 buffer = Vec::with_capacity(new_len);
6 }
7 unsafe { buffer.set_len(new_len); }
8 } else { buffer.truncate(new_len); }
9 buffer
10 } /*other errors do not fill the buffer properly.*/
Code (20) Unsoundness in generator.
1 -://pub fn new(para:*mut Option<A>, /* ignore others*/){...}
2 +:pub fn new(para: &'a mut Option<A>, /* ignore others*/) {...}
3 -:///#[deprecated(since="0.5.0", note="please use `scope` ...")]
4 +:#[deprecated(since = "0.6.18", note = "please use ...")]
5 pub fn yield_<A: Any, T: Any>(v: T) -> Option<A> {...}
6 //don't use it directly, use done!() macro instead...
7 pub fn done<T>() -> T {
8 +: assert!(is_generator(), "done␣is␣only␣possible␣in...");
9 /*ignore the implementation*/
10 }
Figure 7: Other memory-safety bugs.
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Figure 8: Trend of unsound issues in Rust compiler.
Our analysis result reveals that Rust is very effective in
preventing memory-safety bugs if developers use safe Rust only.
In most cases of our dataset, unsafe code is a ecessary piece for
triggering memory-safety bugs except some safe APIs are unsound,
like Code 6. However, safe Rust is not powerful and efficient enough
in some conditions. That’s why we still use unsafe code and have
a few memory-safety bugs in Rust programs. While the extension
of unsafe code makes Rust flexible and powerful, it also brings
memory-safety risks. There is always a tradeoff. Indeed, Rust
has little magics in preventing developers from making general
mistakes, and it is mainly the users’ responsibility to check the
correctness of their code when using unsafe code. In this way, the
risk of suffering memory-safety issues in unsafe code is similar as
other programming languages.
Besides, considering that three memory-safety bugs in our
dataset are compiler bugs and Rust is a young programming
language, users might be interested in the stability of the compiler.
To address this question, we further investigated the project of Rust
compiler on GitHub. There are around two hundred unsoundness
issues (labeled as “I-unsound”) raised by Jan, 2020, which could
violate the memory-safety promise of safe Rust. Figure 8 presents
the numbers of unsoundness issues raised from 2014 to 2019 in a
quarterly manner. We can observe that although the trend of new
issues does not decline, it is much stable. Why unsoundness issues
can hardly be prevented? As the features of Rust keep getting
enriched, introducing new unsoundness issues are unavoidable.
Besides, some unsoundness issues related to the design of the
language are difficult to fix. Taking CVE-2019-12083 (Code 6) as
an example, the temporary fix is to destabilize the function which
raises a warning when employing it. However, this fix is not perfect,
and the issue still keeps open since raised months ago.
5.2 Recommendations to Program Developers
Implication 2: There are best practices that can be recommended to
developers for preventing double-free bugs: 1) disable the destructor
as earlier as possible; 2) set buffer length at an approperiate program
point when shrinking or expanding the buffer.
Some bugs in our dataset share common patterns. We can extract
these patterns and make suggestions to developers for preventing
them.
5.2.1 Disable the Destructor As Earlier As Possible. Four double-
free issues of Section 4.4.2 occur because of calling mem::forget()
too late. Using ManualDrop() can prevent such issues, and it should
be recommended to developers as a best practice. Developers should
pay more attention if they insist on using mem::forget(var).
Because the function borrows the ownership of var which can
prevent further mutating the buffer, it is often impossible to call the
function immediately after allocating the buffer. This gives chances
to program panic before disabling the destructor.
5.2.2 Set Buffer Length at An Appropriate Program Point. When
shrinking or expanding a buffer with unsafe code, the length of the
resulting buffer should be set at an appropriate program point.
If shrinking a buffer with set_len(), the set_len() function
should be called as earlier as possible. Calling the function too
late (e.g., Code 14) would lead to duplicated shared mutable aliases
at some program points. If expending a buffer with set_len(),
the function should be called after the new buffer has been fully
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initialized, or as late as possible. Otherwise, the new buffer may
contain pointers that have not been fully initialized, leading to
dropping invalid pointers.
5.3 Suggestions to Compiler Developers
Implication 3: Compiler developers may extend the current safety
checking to unsafe code, especially performing alias analysis related
to unsafe constructors.
Preventing general memory-safety bugs is hard. According to
Rice’s theorem [17], it is impossible to have a general algorithm for
this problem that is sound, complete, and can terminate. However,
there are also some interesting culprits worth further investigation,
especially those related to unsafe constructors and the side effects
of automatic destruction.
Our main suggestion is to extend alias analysis to unsafe code,
especially for unsafe constructors. In this way, it can prevent
some use-after-free bugs and double-free bugs related to the side
effects of automatic destruction. Note that although general pointer
analysis is hard, this problem can be simplified in two ways. Firstly,
considering only the pointers related to unsafe constructors can
simplify the analysis problem and should still be effective for
the bugs in our dataset. Secondly, there are two approximation
directions for solving such problems, the first direction is to perform
may-alias-then-check, i.e., to maintain an alias pool recording the
may-alias relationship between the source buffer and the newly
constructed variable (e.g., via inclusion-based pointer analysis[2]
which is sound) and then check whether a potential bug caused
by aliases is spurious. The second direction is to perform precise
alias analysis (which is complete) but in a conservative mode, e.g.,
terminate after some threshold. Taking Code 7 as an example, the
returned value v contains an alias of s, both of which are mutable
aliases. If the compiler knows the two pointers could be aligned, it
may transfer the ownership from s to v and avoid destructing s.
Besides, some mutable aliases are generated because of buffer
copy, e.g., via ptr::copy() in Code 14. According to the definition,
ptr::copy() is semantically equivalent to memmove in C, which
copies the source memory to the destination while keeping the
source intact if they are non-overlapping. However, it can lead to
multiple mutable aliases if the copied contents contain pointers.
Since preserving the source buffer is useless in some scenarios, it
might be possible to define another function (e.g., move) that deletes
the source buffer after copy.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our work performs an in-depth study of memory-safety bugs found
in real-world Rust programs. It is mainly based on a dataset of 39
bugs. Although the dataset may not be very large, it contains all
CVEs, which are themost severe bugs. Therefore, our analysis result
should be representative. Moreover, because our study approach
is qualitative and in-depth, the dataset is enough for justifying the
derived findings and implications. As the dataset of bugs getting
further enriched in the future, there could be new types of culprits
found, and the classes we employed in Section 4 could be further
extended. Most importantly, such new bugs would not affect the
correctness of our current findings.
7 RELATEDWORK
7.1 Comparison with Evans’s and Qin’s Work
There are three other independent papers that have similar purposes
as we do, including [9, 16, 20]. Evans et al. [9] performed a large-
scale study regarding the usage of unsafe code, but without bug
analysis. [20] and [16] are produced by the same team, and [20] is
a preprint version. Therefore, we mainly compare the difference of
our paper with [16].
The preprint version [20] by Yu et al. studied 18 concurrency
bugs from three Rust projects, and Qin et al. [16] extended the
work of [20] with more bugs and expand the analysis scope from
concurrency issues to all memory-safety bugs. They categorize
70 memory bugs into four patterns: 1) safe, 2) unsafe, 3) safe-
>unsafe, and 4) unsafe->safe. Based on this categorization, the work
derives some similar results as we do. In comparison, our work
performs an in-depth study regarding the bug patterns, and we
point out the side effects of Rust in introducing new patterns of
use-after-free bugs and double-free bugs. The summarized findings
and implications in our work are different from those of [16], but
they are consistent. Their work can provide extensions to our work,
especially in understanding the concurrency issues of Rust.
7.2 Other Work
While some work shares experience in using Rust, such as [3, 12,
13, 15], there are also several papers that focus on the reliability of
Rust programs [14, 19] and the Rust language system [4, 5, 10].
A majority of existing papers on Rust reliability focuses on
formal verification [4, 7, 10] and bug detection [5, 8, 14, 19]. Formal
verification aims at proving the correctness of Rust programs
mathematically. RustBelt [7, 10] is a representative work in this
direction. It defines a set of rules to model Rust programs and
employs these rules to prove the security of Rust APIs. It has verified
that the basic typing rules of Rust are safe, and any closed programs
based on well-typed Rust should not exhibit undefined behaviors.
Astrauskas et al. [4] proposed a technique that can assist developers
to verify their programs with formal methods. Dewey et al. [8]
proposed a fuzzing testing approach to detect the bugs of Rust
programs. Lindner et al. [14] proposed to detect panic issues of Rust
programs via symbolic execution. Besides, there is also some work
focuses on the unsafe part of Rust and studies how to isolate unsafe
code blocks(e.g.,[1, 11]). We would go into further details because
the purposes these papers are quite different from our paper.
8 CONCLUSION
This work studies the effectiveness of Rust in fighting against
memory-safety bugs. We have manually analyzed the culprits
and consequences of 39 memory-safety bugs covering all Rust
CVEs. Our study results reveal that while Rust successfully limits
the risks of memory-safety issues in the realm of unsafe code, it
also introduces some side effects. In particular, Most of the use-
after-free and double-free bugs in our dataset are related to the
automatic destruction mechanism associated with the ownership-
based memory management scheme. Furthermore, our analysis
results lead to some suggestions to Rust program developers and
compiler developers. For program developers, we provide several
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recommendations concerning the best practices in using some APIs
for preventing dangling pointers. For compiler developers, our
suggestion is to consider extending the current safety checking from
safe code to some unsafe code, especially those unsafe constructors
which are the culprits of several use-after-free bugs and double-
free bugs. We hope our work can raise more discussions regarding
the memory-safety effectiveness of Rust and inspire more ideas
towards improving the resilience of Rust.
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